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ABSTRACT 
 
This article explores the roles of transnational civil society organizations and networks in 
transnational social learning.  It begins with an investigation into social learning within 
problem domains and into the ways in which such domain learning builds perspectives 
and capacities for effective action among domain organizations and institutions.  It 
suggests that domain learning involves problem definition, direction setting, 
implementation of collective action, and performance monitoring.  Transnational civil 
society actors appear to take five roles in domain learning: (1) identifying issues, (2) 
facilitating voice of marginalized stakeholders, (3) amplifying the importance of issues, 
(4) building bridges among diverse stakeholders, and (5) monitoring and assessing 
solutions.  The paper then explores the circumstances in which transnational civil society 
actors can be expected to make special contributions in important problem domains in the 
future. 
 
 
KEY WORDS: transnational civil society networks, international nongovernmental organizations, social 
learning, problem domains, global governance 
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INTRODUCTION 
Civil society actors, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), social movements, 
and advocacy networks, are becoming major players in transnational governance and 
problem-solving.  Together with nation-states, intergovernmental organizations and 
multinational corporations, transnational civil society organizations and networks have 
engaged in defining and in learning how to solve transnational problems in domains 
ranging from human rights to environmental protection to corruption to poverty 
alleviation and development.  Transnational problem domains are social, economic, and 
environmental challenges facing society that affect populations across borders and 
require the involvement of actors in more than one country to resolve. The civil society 
sector is composed of associations, institutions and public discourses organized around 
shared values, in contrast to the organization of the state sector around authority and the 
market sector around exchange (Najam, 1996; Edwards, 2004; Kaldor, 2003; Keane, 
2003). 
 
Scholars have drawn on international relations and social movement theory to chronicle 
the international emergence and influence of civil society actors (e.g., Clark, 2003; Keck 
and Sikkink, 1998; Khagram et al., 2002; Smith et al., 1997; Taylor, 2004; Batliwala and 
Brown, 2006). Accounting for this influence has required a broader focus than traditional 
international relations explanations of national power and interests as primary shapers of 
international policies and behavior.  Scholars have argued, for example, that it is not 
possible to explain the signing of the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
without taking into account the roles played by Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, or 
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to explain the emergence of the current human rights regime without focusing on the role 
of Amnesty International (Johnson, 2000; Risse, 2000). 
 
This article poses two questions: What contributions do civil society actors make to 
transnational social learning processes ? And in what domains are such contributions 
particularly likely? These questions focus the analysis beyond particular cases to examine 
the larger trends suggested by the involvement of civil society actors in transnational 
problem solving and governance.  Past research has examined civil society involvement 
in transnational governance by focusing on their impacts on norm creation (see Risse et 
al., 1999 and Finnemore, 1998), on information politics (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), on the 
spread of democratic ideals (Florini, 2003), and on the delivery of services (Lindenberg 
and Bryant, 2001).  This article uses a social learning lens to examine the role of 
transnational civil society actors in collective problem-solving. 
 
The growing number of interconnected, complex, long-term challenges associated with 
the expansion and globalization of human societies is seriously testing the capacities of 
existing institutional arrangements  (Rischard, 2002; Florini, 2003). These challenges 
often require the involvement of multiple stakeholders across many levels over long time 
periods.  In addition, the knowledge and skills that are required to identify, address, and 
solve these challenges is frequently incomplete and is shifting rapidly.  In an increasingly 
turbulent, interdependent and uncertain world, social learning capacities are pivotal to 
managing risks and recognizing opportunities.  This article first explores the concept of 
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social learning and then turns to the contributions to social learning made by 
transnational civil society organizations and networks. 
 
SOCIAL LEARNING 
‘Social learning’ refers here to processes that increase awareness, capacities and 
repertoires of action amongst actors in a social domain. Social learning increases domain 
capacities, as organizational learning and individual learning increase the capacities of 
organizations and individuals.  We are particularly interested in social learning as a 
process of enhancing awareness, capacity and action to address transnational problem 
domains (Botkin et al., 1979; Korten, 1981; Milbrath, 1989; Finger and Verlaan, 1995; 
Brown, 1999; The Social Learning Group, 2000; Clark, 2001).  More specifically, we are 
concerned with learning that reshapes domain perspectives and actions on critical 
problems. Problem domains involve many diverse actors with stakes in problem-solving 
activities.  Examples include civil society actors, business interests, and government 
agencies concerned about managing a sensitive ecosystem (Weber, 2003) or preventing 
dangerous marketing practices for baby foods (Johnson, 1986). 
 
It has been widely accepted that individuals and organizations can learn, but the concept 
of social learning in larger social systems, including entire societies, remains 
controversial.  Some scholars maintain that societies can and do learn, as indicated by 
fundamental changes in societal institutions and practices (e.g., Botkin, 1979; Milbrath, 
1989: 89).  Others question whether societies as entities can learn, though they argue that 
it is important “to identify the social groupings of individuals within which learning 
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occurs, and the institutional forms that stabilize and transmit the resulting lessons.” 
(Clark, 2001: 382; see also Brown and Ashman, 1999). We focus here on examining 
processes by which learning occurs within interorganizational problem domains.  
Systematic changes in the beliefs, norms and institutions that shape behavior of domains 
and domain actors indicates the possibility of social learning (e.g., Risse et al., 1999; 
Risse, 2000; Khagram et al., 2002; Ingelhart, 1990; Boli and Thomas, 1999). 
 
In organizational contexts theorists have distinguished between orders of learning that 
affect different aspects of organizational functioning.  First order learning focuses on 
improving immediate performance; second order learning addresses norms, values, and 
‘taken-for-granted’ expectations that guide choices and interpretations of events (Argyris 
and Schön, 1996).  Social learning might improve the performance of the domain, or it 
might fundamentally revise domain frames and goals.  Domain learning may become 
evident in changes in domain interactions, performance or perspectives.  Transnational 
domain learning appears to have occurred in the domains of human rights (Risse et al., 
1999), environmental risk management (Hoffman, 2001), and project management at the 
World Bank (Fox and Brown, 1998), though controversies continue about aspects of 
those changes. Domain learning often involves learning begun at the individual and 
organizational levels that becomes embedded in changed perspectives and capacities at 
the domain level.  
 
Discussions of social learning in particular domains sometimes focus on “issue maturity” 
as a way of describing stages of the process (Zadek, 2004).  At the earliest stage, “latent” 
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issues may be perceived by a few actors in the domain and the evidence about issue 
causes and effects may be skimpy or controversial.  At the “emerging” stage, there is 
wider political and media awareness of the issue and more evidence about its causes and 
effects, with some actors beginning to experiment with innovations to deal with it.  The 
“consolidating” stage is characterized by the emergence of more voluntary initiatives, 
increasing acceptance of practices for dealing with the issue, and discussion of litigation 
and possible legislation as well as voluntary standards.  At the “institutionalizing” stage, 
norms of practice are established and the key actors in the domain build responsiveness to 
the issue into their regular practices. As issues mature, new awareness, mental models, 
and behaviors are developed and built into the capacities of the domain and its members 
(Zadek, 2004; Hoffman, 2001). 
 
Social learning in problem domains can be described in terms of processes related to 
issue evolution.  This evolution is represented by the domain learning spiral in Figure 1.  
While different investigators use different terms to describe these processes, most include 
some version of four: (1) problem definition, (2) direction setting, (3) implementation and 
action taking, and (4) evaluation and revision (Brown, 1999; The Social Learning Group, 
2001; Zadek, 2004).  Note that while these phases have a linear logic, it is not clear that 
they always occur in this sequence.  Indeed, some investigations suggest that at the 
national level these phases are shaped by interaction with many other forces, while at the 
transnational level the interaction of apparently non-linear national patterns integrates 
into a more linear process (The Social Learning Group, 2001, Vol 2: 183). 
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Problem definition is a knowledge-intensive phase, particularly when the problem is 
poorly understood or subject to radically different interpretations by different 
stakeholders.  Issue framing in terms of overall concepts and values is central to the 
problem definition process, and frames may be radically affected by new knowledge and 
by stakeholders’ efforts to articulate frames favorable to their interests.  This phase also 
involves the initial stages of agenda-setting and the mobilization of stakeholders 
interested in the issue.  In transnational domains, problem definition processes may take a 
long time and involve much controversy over the problem and its impacts, as in the cases 
of environmental risks or human rights issues. Problem definition moves an issue from 
latency into the emerging stage of issue maturity.  
 
Direction setting processes build an agenda for action on the problem.  These processes 
include coalition building across organizations, sectors and countries among concerned 
stakeholders, issue analysis and risk assessment to create better understanding of options 
and consequences, and goal and strategy formulation across coalition members 
committed to problem-solving.  This phase uses knowledge-intensive activities to create a 
base for the action-intensive activities needed for later phases of problem-solving. 
 
The implementation and action taking phase builds on the wider awareness and improved 
understanding of the problem generated by earlier phases. Its activities focus on planning 
for action, capacity building, institution development, and eventually collective action on 
the issues.  These functions can be action-intensive rather than knowledge intensive, 
since knowledge resources and institutional support for action have been created in 
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earlier phases; however, frequently actors are faced with uncertainty as to the 
consequences of their actions, and with incomplete information about the nature of the 
problem or the appropriateness of solutions. By adopting a learning approach, actors in a 
problem domain can practice adaptive management in which implementation is 
undertaken as a form of experimentation that enables learning from action (Lee, 1993; 
Rondinelli, 1983).  The complexity of the implementation process varies by the types of 
actions adopted and the size and scale at which these actions are undertaken.  
 
Finally, the evaluation and revision phase uses experience with early problem-solving 
activities to improve and institutionalize new awareness, norms, practices and behaviors 
generated by the domain learning process.  It includes first-order learning initiatives for 
error detection and operational learning from initial problem-solving activities. It may 
also involve second-order learning, which leads to an exploration of values, redefinition 
of the problem, and more strategic domain learning on the basis of that experience.  Out 
of evaluation and revision activities emerge revised and reinforced responses to a mature 
issue as well as the recognition of new or associated issues that may require further 
domain learning.   Complex problems may require multiple cycles of this learning 
process. 
 
Figure one represents the domain learning spiral and its processes of issue evolution. The 
stages of issue maturity are portrayed in the progression to the right of the spiral.  The 
figure suggests that actors in a problem domain may build knowledge and capacity at 
each stage of issue maturity, and spiral upwards and out toward improved understanding 
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of the problem, wider inclusion of stakeholders, and enhanced problem-solving 
performance.  Such domain learning expands the awareness and capacities of the domain 
to deal with problems in the future. 
 
On the other hand, not all domain learning is necessarily constructive.  It is possible for 
domains to become locked in self-fulfilling cycles that make new learning and alternative 
actions very difficult, or for the process to spiral inward to narrowly-defined and less-
inclusive solutions than those implied by the expanding spiral.  The next section 
specifically explores the roles of transnational civil society actors in such domain 
learning processes.
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Figure 1: A Problem Domain Learning Spiral and Stages of Issue Maturity 
 
 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS AND DOMAIN LEARNING 
Scholars have been confronted with a puzzle in the growing role of civil society actors in 
transnational governance.  Without the state authority of governments or the economic 
power of business, how do civil society actors wield transnational influence?  
Researchers have argued that civil society influence derives from their use of credible 
information and symbols, their persuasive tactics, the moral pressure of principled ideas, 
and their expertise in work on critical problems (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Florini, 2000; 
Edwards and Gaventa, 2001; Clark, 2003a; 2003b).  Some transnational civil society 
actors are organizations that operate in several countries. Others are transnational 
networks characterized by information sharing, common analyses, and shared discourses, 
or transnational coalitions that share strategies and coordinate tactics in addition to 
network capacities.  Yet others are transnational social movements that add the capacity 
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to mobilize collective action in multiple countries (Khagram et al., 2002; see also 
Gordenker and Weiss, 1995). Our focus here is on the roles that such organizations and 
networks play in transnational domain learning.  We can identify at least five such 
transnational civil society roles: (1) identifying emerging issues, (2) facilitating 
grassroots voice, (3) building bridges to link diverse stakeholders, (4) amplifying the 
public visibility and importance of issues, and (5) monitoring problem-solving 
performance. We will briefly discuss and illustrate each of these roles below. 
1. IDENTIFYING ISSUES 
The identification of transnational problems is a social and political construction process 
that frames problems in terms of prevailing values and norms, articulates their 
consequences, and mobilizes initial stakeholder concerns (Snow and Bedford, 1988; 
Klandermans, 1997; Hajer, 1995). The way in which an issue is framed is subject to 
social negotiation that includes not only what actors say but also what they do in the 
problem domain.  Transnational civil society actors contribute to identifying problems by 
lobbying international agencies, by symbolic media campaigns, and by communicating 
experiences to raise public awareness.   
 
Amnesty International, for example, exemplifies the role of issue identifier (Risse, 2000).  
Amnesty International works with local branches to identify specific violations of human 
rights, often within countries ruled by repressive regimes, and to mobilize world public 
opinion to support victims of those abuses.  Amnesty draws on the transnational 
agreement embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to challenge regime 
behavior and create transnational costs for rights abusers..  Over the years, thousands of 
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political prisoners have been helped by public outcries and government pressures in 
response to Amnesty’s work.  Amnesty has been able to carry out this role because the 
Universal Declaration and other documents, to which many countries are signatories, 
establish shared transnational expectations for human rights.  Even regimes with little 
commitment to civil and political rights dislike being publicly identified as a rights 
violator, and over time the interaction of transnational and national actors can put 
significant pressure on regimes to comply with human rights norms, even if they are 
initially resistant to limits on their sovereignty (Brysk and Jacquemine, 2006). 
 
Identifying and framing problems as violations of widely-held expectations can have 
powerful effects.  Reframing the discourse about gene modification in agriculture as 
adding a ‘terminator gene’ to seeds or relabeling female circumcision as ‘female genital 
mutilation’ can profoundly affect how the issues are seen by the general public.  Frames 
that emphasize harm to vulnerable populations or barriers to equality of opportunity have 
wide resonance and a kind of ‘stickiness’ that prevents other frames from emerging 
(Keck and Sikkink, 1998; The Social Learning Group, 2001). Transnational civil society 
actors can articulate frames that enable actors from different countries to recognize their 
shared interests.  The transnational women’s movement, for example, united diverse 
national movements—against rape of women political prisoners in Latin America, dowry 
deaths in South Asia, female genital mutilation in Africa, and spousal abuse in North 
America—under the frames of “violence against women” and “human rights” and so 
mobilized many more supporters (Keck and Sikkink, 2001: 165-198). Problem 
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identification makes special use of the social creativity and legitimacy of transnational 
civil society actors.    
2. ENABLING VOICE  
Transnational problems often have powerful impacts on populations that are poor, 
marginalized, and vulnerable, and on other silent stakeholders including non-human 
species and future generations.  A key role for some civil society actors is representing 
these unheard voices and helping marginalized groups affected by transnational issues to 
organize themselves, build capacity to engage with decision-makers, and develop 
influence strategies and campaigns for more voice in decisions that affect them.  In the 
loosely organized context of transnational policy-making it is easy to overlook the 
concerns and interests of silent stakeholders and of grassroots groups with little political 
clout.   
 
For example, indigenous groups in many countries have been the victims of the 
construction of large dams that provide power, irrigation and other services to some 
populations while submerging the lands and livelihoods of others with less voice in 
decision-making (Hall, 1992; Khagram, 2004). Over the last several decades 
transnational NGOs and networks like Environmental Defense Fund and Oxfam-UK have 
worked with indigenous groups to enable their voice through identifying upcoming dam 
projects, organizing resistance, and building alliances for lobbying national governments, 
transnational corporations, and intergovernmental agencies in order to make sure that 
local interests are considered in planning and constructing dams (Hall, 1992).  Not all of 
these campaigns have been successful, but continued experience has built a transnational 
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network of indigenous people’s organizations that is increasingly sophisticated about 
influencing transnational policy-making.  The rate of construction of large dams has 
plummeted in recent decades, given the increased political, social and economic costs of 
dealing with organized resistance.  In addition, indigenous groups are treated with 
increased respect as they demonstrate their capacity to exert political voice in decisions 
that affect them. 
 
A critical issue for transnational civil society actors involved in strengthening the voice 
of marginalized groups is avoiding the temptation to substitute their own views for those 
of their constituents.  Ironically campaign targets may help them resist that temptation:  
World Bank staff, challenged to respond to the needs of grassroots groups affected by 
Bank projects, increasingly demand evidence that transnational civil society actors in fact 
represent real constituents.  Over the last several decades those constituents have begun 
to build their own transnational networks and organizations, such as Shack/Slum 
Dwellers International (SDI), which represents urban slum dwellers, or Women in 
Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO), which carries out research 
and policy advocacy for a federation of unions of street vendors and domestic workers 
(Batliwala, 2002).  
3. AMPLIFYING ISSUES 
Transnational civil society actors may also contribute to social learning by amplifying the 
visibility and impact of emerging issues.  Processes of amplification include leverage 
through mobilizing and targeting key actors, lending legitimacy to the issue, emphasizing 
its impacts on wider constituencies, and engaging in symbolic actions that draw attention 
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to the problem.  Issue amplification gains broader visibility for the issue, raises public 
awareness and support, and mobilizes wider and deeper coalitions for problem-solving.   
 
An example of issue amplification is the role of Jubilee 2000 in the transnational 
campaign for debt forgiveness for heavily indebted poor countries (Pettifor, 2000).  .  
This campaign drew on the tradition of forgiving debts in many different world religions.  
It had become evident that servicing national debt, often incurred by authoritarian leaders 
who lined their own pockets rather than make productive use of the loans, was seriously 
undermining the capacity of many developing countries to invest in sustainable 
development.  Jubilee 2000 mobilized churches, NGOs, and other concerned groups to 
advocate recycling developing country debt into development projects.  They organized 
thousands of demonstrators in many countries to influence policy-makers.  The campaign 
helped supporters to understand the complexities of international debt and its impacts, 
and to build alliances across many religions, parties, and unions. The World Bank 
program for converting debt into social spending in highly indebted poor countries is in 
part a response to civil society amplification of support for debt forgiveness. 
 
Transnational amplification processes may take many forms.  Sometimes they convert 
otherwise abstract findings (e.g. about climate change or Third World debt) into 
information relevant to policy, media and the public through scientific and policy reports 
or through creative communication campaigns, as in the trademark events of NGOs like 
Greenpeace.  On other occasions they endow initially extreme ideas with wider 
respectability and influence.   The idea of women’s suffrage, for example, became a 
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credible campaign as it was taken up by a widely-based women’s movement (Keck and 
Sikkink, 2001: 51-58). In other cases, civil society actors mobilize transnational forces to 
affect national decision-makers. The human rights and environmental movements 
publicize local violations to use a “boomerang effect” to influence intransigent national 
decision-makers by international pressure (Risse et al., 1999). This amplification role can 
be controversial:  Some perceive transnational civil society actors, particularly Northern-
based agencies, to wield disproportionate influence without adequate acknowledgement 
or compensation to Southern partners (Batliwala, 2002). In some cases, transnational and 
local actors can complement each other; in others their interests can be in conflict 
(Brechin, 2003; Dudley and Stolton, 1999). Amplifying the visibility of issues can be 
abused if transnational actors are not accountable to the stakeholders they claim to 
represent. 
4. BUILDING BRIDGES 
It is often easy to focus on differences in transnational problems and so exacerbate 
separation and conflicts that make problem-solving difficult.  Some transnational civil 
society actors emphasize building bridges among diverse stakeholders in contested 
problem domains by convening meetings of diverse actors, negotiating shared definitions 
of problems and possible directions, and facilitating identification and deployment of 
complementary resources and capacities. Some have built bridges across levels, from 
local to national to global; others have worked across national boundaries; still others 
have emphasized connection across the business, government and civil society sectors 
(Brown, 1991).  Bridge-building can include the creation and use of boundary-spanning 
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devices such as reports, maps or computer models that serve to bring diverse stakeholders 
together (Cash, 2001: 440).  
 
Transparency International (TI), for example, has been a particularly successful bridge-
building initiative on the problem of transnational corruption (Galtung 2000).  TI was 
created as a transnational vehicle for corruption reform.  From the start it focused on 
building coalitions among government officials, civil society leaders and business 
executives to create programs that would limit corruption in international business and 
development projects.  TI decided against a “whistle-blowing” approach that would 
emphasize unmasking specific cases of corruption in order to build reform coalitions with 
leaders from many sectors.  TI built alliances of national leaders to support international 
regulation and catalyzed wide discussion of national rankings of perceived “corrupt 
practices” and “bribe paying.”  It also fostered the creation of independent national 
organizations to promote governance reform at the national level. Many of these 
initiatives are planned and implemented in partnership with the World Bank, which once 
dismissed corruption as an unchangeable “fact of life.”  TI has built bridges across many 
different gulfs in its campaigns to reduce corruption. 
 
Building bridges across the differences in wealth, power, and perspective that 
characterize many transnational issues is no small task.  It requires skills such as 
managing conflict, facilitating constructive dialogue, fostering mutual understanding, 
negotiating mutually acceptable deals, and creatively synthesizing across diverse 
perspectives (Gray, 1989; Austin, 2000). Bridging work may also focus on linking local 
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to national civil society movements to build sustained capacity for dealing with the 
domestic effects of a transnational problem (Rodrigues, 2004). As a mediator among 
stakeholders, civil society actors can facilitate engagements among complementary 
resources that enable domain learning that cannot be accomplished by a single level, 
sector or country.  
4. MONITORING PERFORMANCE  
Monitoring systems that supply information and analysis about the effectiveness of social 
problem-solving initiatives can identify problem areas, improve implementation, 
accelerate problem-solving, and provide information for holding actors accountable.  
They may also identify new problems or unintended consequences. Such feedback can be 
critical for domain learning. Transnational civil society actors, sometimes in cooperation 
with experts, the media and other monitoring agencies, can play important roles in getting 
and analyzing data about the impacts of problem solving.  This “watch dog” role of 
transnational civil society organizations and networks is often cited as being a key part of 
successful transnational problem-solving (Mock, 2003). Transnational civil society actors 
may help various actors process that data for learning purposes.   
 
For example, transnational civil society actors have played important monitoring roles in 
campaigns to regulate and certify forest and apparel products (Bartley 2003).  These 
certification systems emerged in the 1990s in part due to civil society campaigns focused 
on the Nike Corporation’s labor standards in Indonesian factories and the sale of tropical 
timber at Home Depot.   The establishment of monitoring initiatives, such as the Forestry 
Stewardship Council, the Sustainable Forestry Initiative and the CSA-International, 
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resulted from concern regarding the environmental conditions and deforestation practices 
in the forest products industry.  Monitoring by the Fair Labor Association, Social 
Accountability International, and Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production emerged in 
response to protests about low labor standards and sweatshops in the apparel industry.  
Transnational civil society actors work through partnerships with corporations or 
representation on Boards to play important roles in developing performance criteria and 
monitoring industry compliance with those criteria (Bartley 2003). 
 
Transnational civil society actors can develop new or monitor existing standards for 
evaluating transnational problem management.  Civil society actors may have privileged 
access to information from their constituencies or other marginalized groups.  The 
International Baby Food Campaign, for example, created a network to monitor 
compliance with new regulations on marketing infant formula in rural Africa.  On the 
other hand, some circumstances exceed civil society capacities to monitor performance: 
The UN’s Global Compact offers a forum for corporate learning to foster norms of 
human rights, labor standards, and environmental conservation, but there is considerable 
skepticism about the feasibility of having its civil society members assess all of its 
corporate members (Ruggie, 2002; 2003). 
 
CONCLUSION 
These examples suggest that transnational civil society organizations and networks can 
contribute to domain learning even when they have neither the resources of the corporate 
sector nor the authority of government agencies.  Figure 2 builds on the domain learning 
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spiral and stages of issue maturity depicted in Figure 1 by indicating the points along 
issue evolution at which the contributions of civil society actors seem most likely.  Note 
that civil society contributions, with the exception of performance monitoring, tend to 
cluster at the problem defining and direction setting aspects of domain learning.  While 
enabling voice and bridge building can be relevant to many phases, they are particularly 
important in framing the issues in the problem definition and direction setting stages, 
since the frames established there fundamentally shape action and subsequent evaluation. 
Civil society organizations and networks are endowed in the currencies of ideas, 
information and values rather than with formal power or financial resources.  Even the 
monitoring role can be seen as part of the problem definition in that it provides 
information and ideas for redefining old or identifying new problems.   
 
While civil society actors often play roles in the implementation of problem solutions, it 
is in shaping definitions and directions that they exert their most important impacts on 
domain learning.  Implementation actions undertaken by transnational civil society 
actors, such as establishing demonstration projects or delivering services, are seldom the 
size and scale of solutions that are required for transnational problem solving.  
Implementation to address transnational problems requires actions by powerful and well-
resourced actors such as governments, international organizations and large firms.  
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Figure 2.  Transnational Civil Society Roles in a Domain Learning Spiral 
 
 
 
 
 
Although it is possible to define transnational civil society actor contributions along the 
issue evolution spiral, the stage of issue maturity at which civil society actors are most 
likely to contribute can vary across problem domains. In the human rights domain, for 
example, civil society actors were part of the coalition that brought the issue out of 
latency (Keck and Sikkink, 1998).  In the environmental domains of acid rain, ozone 
depletion and climate change, civil society actors engaged after the issue had been 
defined by the scientific community (The Social Learning Group, 2001). 
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Given these patterns, what can we say about the domains in which transnational civil 
society organizations and networks are most likely to be important actors?  First, domains 
in which the problems are linked to strongly held values are likely to draw attention from 
existing civil society organizations and networks or to catalyze the creation of new civil 
society actors. The impacts of free trade on a variety of important values, from economic 
justice to environmental degradation, set the stage for widespread involvement by civil 
society actors.  Second, domain problems that affect vulnerable groups are more likely to 
elicit civil society initiatives. Concern about marginalized populations and their voice in 
transnational decision-making, such as the fate of indigenous peoples dispossessed by 
large dams, often catalyzes civil society action.  Third, when past domain dynamics have 
already generated social and intellectual capital to support transnational campaigns, 
often in the form of advocacy alliances and experience, civil society activism is more 
likely.  Fourth, civil society roles in domain learning are particularly likely when they 
have developed legitimacy with their constituents and with the larger publics.  So civil 
society participation in the domain learning processes around large dam construction 
became increasingly likely as indigenous groups developed their own organizations and 
as larger publics recognized the injustices being done to them. 
 
In what kinds of domains are civil society actors less likely to play important roles in 
social learning?  What characteristics make useful civil society participation more 
problematic?  First, they may be marginalized in situations where some parties dominate 
decision-making to the exclusion of civil society actors.   It has been difficult for civil 
society actors to influence the World Bank’s policies on structural adjustment, for 
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example, or the Bush Administration’s prosecution of the war in Iraq and its impacts on 
civilian populations.  Second, civil society actors have less influence when information is 
not available or problems are poorly understood.  Initiatives that increase transparency 
of governments and corporations and efforts to clarify the impacts of complex problems 
like climate change can increase the likelihood of civil society participation in 
transnational problem-solving and social learning.  Third, civil society actors may have 
difficulty working effectively across polarized values and ideologies, in part because they 
are quite vulnerable to value and ideological polarization themselves.  Transparency 
International, for example, struggled to resist the temptation to “whistle-blow” about 
specific instances of corruption in order to build broad coalitions for reform.  Fourth, civil 
society actors contribute less to domain learning when they have not grappled 
successfully with questions about their own legitimacy, transparency and accountability 
with respect to the issues.  When their potential influence is grounded in their principles 
and values, civil society actors cannot afford to let continuing legitimacy questions erode 
their credibility.  Civil society organizations and networks are likely to contribute less to 
domain learning in the contexts of large power differences, lack of transparency or 
understanding of the problems, polarized value and ideological positions, and unresolved 
questions about their own legitimacy.   
 
In our increasingly interconnected and interdependent world, the demand for social 
learning appears to be escalating at many levels.  While many factors can inhibit the roles 
of transnational civil society organizations and networks in social learning, they have 
been playing increasingly important roles in domain learning in several areas for the last 
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two decades (Nye and Donohue, 2000; Florini, 2003). Social learning is neither easy nor 
automatic.  It demands investments of time, effort and resources and it requires the 
capacity to use differences in perspective and information to synthesize new knowledge 
and innovative responses to complex problems.  The experiences of recent years suggest 
that the growing capacities of transnational civil society actors can be an important asset 
in grappling with global problems and global governance—provided that civil society 
actors as well as government and business stakeholders continue to invent ways to work 
together constructively in creating new ideas, solutions and institutions.   
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